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The defense of voluntary intoxication from alcohol or drugs' in
criminal cases has had an uncertain, and since 1971, controversial history
in Pennsylvania. The 1976 amendment to section 308 of the Crimes Code
marks the fourth major legislative or judicial change in the intoxication
defense in five years.' Section 308 now provides:
Neither voluntary intoxication nor voluntary drugged con-
dition is a defense to a criminal charge, nor may evidence of such
conditions be introduced to negative the element of intent of the
offense, except that evidence of such intoxication or drugged
condition of the defendant may be offered by the defendant
whenever it is relevant to reduce murder from a higher degree to
a lower degree of murder.
3
What does section 308 mean? Does section 308 provide the best
solution-or at least a satisfactory solution-to the problems that surround
the intoxication defense? This article addresses these questions of statutory
interpretation and of legislative policy and choice along with some con-
stitutional issues that skulk behind the spare language of the statute.
4
II. The Meaning of Amended Section 308
The great majority of American jurisdictions follow what may be
* B.S., United States Military Academy, West Point, 1946; LL.B., Harvard Law
School, 1952; Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law. The author gratefully acknow-
ledges the assistance of Spero Thomas Lappas of the Dickinson Law Review.
1. Although arguably it need not be so, the law consistently deals with intoxication in
the same manner whether it results from the consumption of alcohol or use of drugs. In this
article the term "intoxication" will be used to refer both to drunkenness and drugged
condition. The term "drunkenness" and its synonyms should also be understood to encom-
pass drugged condition unless the context indicates otherwise.
2. The history of the intoxication defense in Pennsylvania from the eighteenth century
until 1975 is well documented in an article and two casenotes in earlier issues of this review.
Smith, Intoxication as a Defense to a Criminal Charge in Pennsylvania, 76 DICK. L. REV. 15,
52-53 (1971); Note, Intoxication as a Defense to a Criminal Charge in Pennsylvania-Sequel,
76 DICK. L. REV. 324 (1972); 80 DICK. L. REV. 640 (1976).
3. 18 PA. CONs. STAT. § 308(1975), as amended byAct of April 7,1976, P.L. -,Act 32
(1976 Pa. Legis. Serv. 55).
4. This article does not deal with the problems of involuntary intoxication and of
insanity resulting from the use of alcohol or drugs nor with the legal and factual difficulties in
distinguishing between those conditions and simple voluntary intoxication. On these matters
see MODEL PENAL CODE 9-12 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); Smith, supra note 3, citing
Pennsylvania cases.
characterized as a "capacity defense" approach to the defense of voluntary
intoxication. In employing this defense, a distinction is traditionally made
between specific mens rea crimes, such as premeditated murder, burglary
and receiving stolen property, which for conviction require proof of some
particular intent, knowledge or the like, and general mens rea crimes, such
as common-law murder, rape and assault, which do not require proof of
any such specific mental state. In an article in the University of Illinois Law
Forum, Professor Paulsen reported that he found close to unanimous
agreement on the fundamentals of the capacity defense:
Under the existing law the fact of intoxication neither aggra-
vates nor excuses. The present position of the law was sum-
marized simply in an Indiana case decided at the turn of the
century. Drunkenness is not considered 'upon the ground that it
of itself excuses or palliates the crime, but is admitted and
considered only for the purpose of ascertaining the condition of
the mind of the accused in order to determine whether he was
incapable of entertaining the specific intent charged, where such
intent, under the law, is an essential ingredient of the particular
crime. '5
Paulsen went on to point out that it is now commonly accepted that
specific mens rea crimes require conscious psychological states, i.e.,
conscious purpose or knowledge. As a matter of logic, extreme intoxica-
tion, because it does affect mental processes, can blot out such mental
states. Almost all courts and legislatures nowadays are willing to grant
evidence of intoxication whatever logical relevance it may have to disprove
specific mens rea.
6
It was this kind of capacity defense approach to voluntary intoxication
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected in 1971 in Commonwealth v.
Tarver,7 except for crimes which, like murder, are divided into degrees. It
was this kind of capacity defense that the Pennsylvania Legislature
accepted apparently inadvertently when it originally enacted section 308 as
part of the new Crimes Code in 1972.8 It was this kind of capacity defense
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted in the 1975 case of Common-
wealth v. Graves9 for crimes committed before the effective date of the
Crimes Code. And it was this kind of capacity defense that the legislature,
reacting to Graves, renounced through its 1976 amendment to Crimes
Code section 308 except as to murder.
The criminal instructions subcommittee of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's Committee on Standard Jury Instructions recently proposed pattern
jury instructions to implement section 308. The text of the proposed
instructions and portions of the subcommittee's explanatory notes are set
out in an appendix to this article. Not surprisingly, the author endorses the
5. Paulsen, Intoxication as a Defense to Crime, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 2 (citation
omitted).
6. Paulsen, supra note 5, at 8-9.
7. 446 Pa. 233, 284 A.2d 759 (1971).
8. See text at note 45 infra (text of original § 308).
9. 461 Pa. 118, 334 A.2d 661 (1975).
subcommittee's proposed jury charges and agrees with it that section 308
seeks
[t]o foreclose the defensive use of voluntary intoxication by
disallowing it as a substantive defense, except to reduce first
degree murder to third degree murder,'0 and by barring the
introduction of evidence of voluntary intoxication when offered
to prove the defendant incapable of an 'intent' element of the
crime, i.e., a specific mens rea. Disallowing intoxication as a
substantive defense to specific mens rea crimes does create
conceptual and policy problems. To the extent that the mental
element of certain crimes is ordinarily considered to require a
rather high level of conscious awareness and to the extent that
gross intoxication is factually inconsistent with such awareness,
the legislature has in effect redefined the elements of those
crimes when the putative offender is drunk or drugged ....
Section 308 should be interpreted to redefine the mental ele-
ments of specific mens rea crimes when the offender is drunk or
drugged to require merely a watered-down form of specific mens
rea.
All that should be necessary is that the required intent, knowledge or other
mental state be present somewhere in the offender's besotted mind or be
expressed in his acts regardless of whether he is aware of it. 12
By way of illustration, consider the following hypothetical. Defend-
ant is charged with theft of a portable radio in violation of section 3921 (a)
of the Crimes Code. 13 The jury has heard testimony about how the defend-
ant carried away the radio including testimony that he was quite drunk.
Early in its charge to the jury the court would instruct on the elements of
theft by taking, including the element of "intent to deprive permanently or
for an extended period," 4 and make it clear that the jury cannot convict
10. Although the language of section 308 suggests that evidence of an intoxicated
condition may reduce the degree of either first degree or second degree murder, i.e., felony
murder, a reduction of second degree murder does not square with the legislature's apparent
intent to return to the law of Tarver. Tarver involved a felony murder defendant; he was not
allowed to rely on the intoxication defense. Also, it would be anomalous if the courts were to
allow intoxication to rebut the specific intent element of a felony when the felony is part of a
second degree murder charge but not when the felony is charged alone. Of course, the
reduction of a drunken felony murderer's crime to murder of the third degree lies within the
discretionary power of the jury. A jury may always reduce the grade of a felonious homicide
as a matter of grace. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142 (1974).
ii. Pa. Sup. Ct. Comm. on Standard Jury Instructions, Draft Report, at 2 (April 24,
1976). (The author of this article serves as co-reporter to the subcommittee.)
12. An argument might be made that section 308 should be read literally, that it does not
alter the normal element of intent in any crime but merely forbids the use of evidence of
intoxication to negate the required intent, and that, in doing so, the legislature has invaded the
Supreme Court's constitutional prerogative of making rules of evidence, PA. CONST. art. V, §
9(c), has barred the use of relevant evidence with insufficient justification, and allows
conviction without proof beyond reasonable doubt in violation of the state and federal
constitutions. See 80 DiCK. L. REV. 640,644 n.27 (1976). The author regards this argument as
untenable. Amended section 308 is susceptible to the different interpretation given it by the
subcommittee and, as will appear, that interpretation is constitutional.
13. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3921(a) (1975).
14. Actually the instruction on the intent element of theft must be more elaborate to
conform with id. § 3901, which defines "deprive" as:
(1) To withhold property of another permanently or for so extended a period as
to appropriate a major portion of its economic value, or with intent to restore only
upon payment of reward or other compensation; or
(2) To dispose of the property so as to make it unlikely that the owner will
recover it.
unless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt as to all elements. The judge,
adapting the proposed subcommittee instruction to the case, might then
continue:
Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a criminal charge.
A person who voluntarily uses intoxicants cannot become so
drunk that he is for that reason legally incapable of committing a
crime.
One of the elements of theft, as I told you, is that the
defendant had a certain mental state, that is, the defendant
intended to deprive the owner of his radio permanently or for an
extended period. A defendant cannot be guilty of theft unless he
had that state of mind at the time of the alleged crime. However,
in the case of a voluntarily intoxicated defendant it is not neces-
sary that the defendant be conscious or aware of his own state of
mind. It is enough if the required intent is present somewhere in
his drunken mind or is expressed in his acts.
Our hypothetical case, which assumes that the jury heard testimony
that the defendant was drunk, points up a problem dealt with only inferen-
tially by the criminal instructions subcommittee. Section 308 provides that
evidence of voluntary intoxication may not be introduced "to negative the
element of intent of the offense." Under what circumstances should the
trial judge admit or exclude evidence tending to prove the defendant was
intoxicated at the time of the crime?
Section 308 should be construed as calling for the exclusion of
evidence that is not part of the res gestae and that would have no probative
value other than to show that the defendant was so intoxicated he was
unable to form a specific mens rea consciously or at a high level of
awareness.
Conversely, if the evidence of intoxication is relevant to "negative
the element of intent" in some other fashion, e.g., by establishing or
bolstering a claim of accident, mistake or jest, the evidence should be
admitted. For example, if our radio thief asserts that he thought the radio
belonged to himself, or that he was playing a joke on the owner and
intended to return the radio, he should be allowed to support his claim,
which otherwise might be unbelievable, with evidence that he was drunk. 15
In drafting section 308 the legislature seems to have been concerned with
abolishing the capacity defense as explicated in Graves. It is unlikely that
its prohibition against introduction of intoxication evidence "to negative
15. A rule of admissibility that turns upon whether proffered evidence of intoxication
would be relevant solely to negate capacity or whether it is relevant to negate intent in some
other fashion may occasionally be hard to apply. For example, assume that the defendant is
charged with intentionally causing bodily injury with a knife. The victim was drunk and is a
poor witness; there is little or no other eyewitness testimony describing the defendant's
words, conduct or condition. The defendant testifies that he was drunk and does not
remember what happened. The defense counsel then proffers evidence that the defendant
was grossly intoxicated not long before the crime and argues that the court should admit the
evidence because it supports a rational hypothesis that the stabbing was not intentional but
rather the result of accident or non-volitional conduct. The defendant may have had the knife
in hand for some innocent purpose and lurched or stumbled against the victim. In such a case,
and in other doubtful cases, the trial court ought to admit the evidence of intoxication and
allow the jury to assess its probative value.
the element of intent" was intended literally-to bar the defensive use of
all such evidence on the issue of intent. This ambiguity in the amended
section 308 seems to be the product of a legislative effort to reverse the
policy of the original section with minimum alteration of language. 16
III. Amended Section 308 and Possible Legislative Alternatives
Any legislature considering what to do about voluntary intoxication
must decide the basic policy question: Should drunk or drugged persons be
treated the same as sober persons? Or should special substantive or eviden-
tiary rules be applied to them? 7 A legislature's answer is likely to be
determined, at least in part, by whether its members wish to express
antipathy for intoxicated offenders and whether they mistrust the intoxica-
tion defense. Even in the most permissive or hedonistic of our American
states, many people still regard the act of getting drunk as antisocial and
morally reprehensible. Even more people are likely to condemn the use of
drugs. Furthermore, one can readily conceive reasons for mistrusting the
intoxication defense. It might be abused by defendants, e.g., by a defend-
ant who deliberately gets drunk before commiting a crime to provide
himself a fabricated defense.' i It might confuse the jury or otherwise be
difficult to adminster.
There are a variety of ways in which a legislature can deal with
intoxication, including the two basic approaches between which Pennsyl-
vania law has vacillated since 1971. Possible legislative alternatives
include: (i) complete elimination of specific mens rea requirements when
the defendant is intoxicated; (ii) adoption of the "old common law"
treatment of intoxication, which we shall see is very much like that of
amended section 308 or of Tarver, (iii) adoption of a capacity defense
16. For text of original § 308 of the Crimes Code, see text at note 45 infra.
17. The draftsmen of the Model Penal Code's section on intoxication put the question
this way when they submitted their work to the members of the American Law Institute for
approval:
1. Should self-induced intoxication be accorded a significance co-extensive with
its relevancy to prove or disprove an element of the offense charged or should
its admissibility to exculpate be limited on grounds of legal policy?
2. If the exculpating import of intoxication is to be limited, is it a sufficient
limitation to provide, as the draft does, that unawareness of a risk, of which the
actor would have been aware had he been sober, is immaterial upon a charge of
recklessness?
MODEL PENAL CODE xi (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). For general discussions of voluntary
intoxication as a defense see id. at 1-9, 12-13; Murphy, TheDefense of Voluntary lntoxication,
9 A.B.A.L. NOTES 7 (1972); Murphy, The Intoxication Defense: An Introduction to Mr.
Smith's Article, 76 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1971).
18. This fear of the criminal who finds not only courage in the bottle but exculpation as
well was voiced by Justice Eagen in his dissent in Graves:
Only a person blind to reality could fail to perceive that there is no practical
difference between the admission of evidence to negate an element of the crime and
the admission of evidence to constitute a defense. The end result is that human life
and property would hardly be considered any longer as being under legal protec-
tion. An individual will henceforth be permitted to avail himself of his voluntary
intoxication to exempt him from any legal responsibility which would attach to him,
if sober. As one noted annotator said in speaking of voluntary intoxication as a
defense to criminal responsibility, '. . . all that the crafty criminal would require
for a well planned . . . [robbery or burglary] would be a revolver in one hand to
commit the deed and a quart of intoxicating liquor in the other.'
461 Pa. at 130, 334 A.2d at 667 (citation omitted).
approach, as in the original section 308 or in Graves; (iv) creation of
special crimes which can be committed by intoxicated persons; and (v)
adoption of some modification or combination of alternatives (it) through
(iv).
19
A. Elimination of Specific Mens Rea
A legislature might enact an intoxication rule that would allow an
accused charged with a crime ordinarily requiring proof of specific intent,
knowledge or similar mental state to be convicted of that crime simply
upon proof of all elements of the crime, other than the specific mental
element, if the jury believed that the accused was grossly intoxicated. This
kind of a statute is more a theoretical than an actual possibility. It deserves
some thought, however, because it highlights objections that can be urged,
although less persuasively, against amended section 308.
Complete elimination of the mental element would not work too badly
with some specific mens rea crimes. Common-law robbery is an example.
It would not be patently unfair to punish a drunken defendant for robbery
who takes property by violence or intimidation from the person or presence
of another without regard to the defendant's intent. Even though he may
lack one of the usual requisites for robbery, a specific intent to rob or steal,
the residual conduct of the "robber" entails substantial harm and danger.
Punishment would serve a retributive function, would get an individual
who appears dangerous-at least when drunk-off the streets, and might
deter others.
Elimination of the mental element, however, would work very badly
with many other specific mens rea crimes. Consider burglary as defined in
section 3502(a) of the Crimes Code: "A person is guilty of burglary if he
enters a building . . .with intent to commit a crime therein .... -20
Burglary is a felony of the first degree punishable by imprisonment for up
to twenty years. 2 Assume that the defendant was wandering the streets,
grossly intoxicated, entered a store through a door that the owner forgot to
lock, and was found asleep in the store. If the requisite "intent to commit a
crime" were disregarded in the case of a drunken "burglar" the defendant
could be convicted of the first degree felony and even severely punished.
He would be entirely dependent for justice upon the discretion and good
sense of the prosecutor, court or jury and not in the slightest upon the Code.
The gravamen of burglary is the specific intent to commit a crime
when the building is entered. If this element were eliminated our defendant
would be punished without having the contemporaneous blameworthy
mental state or culpability ordinarily required for true crimes. His only real
19. Another legislative alternative is to leave the whole matter to the courts. This was
done everywhere before the days of comprehensive penal codes and in Pennsylvania as
recently as 1972.
20. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3502(a) (1975).
21. Id. §§ 3502(c), 1103(0).
blameworthiness would be in the relatively minor delict of getting drunk
some time earlier. There is little culpability, harm or danger inherent in a
simple entry into a building. As Justice Jackson said in Morrisette v.
United States22 in holding that the requirement of an "intent to steal"
should be read into a federal criminal conversion statute:
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only
when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It
is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in
freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty of
the normal individual to choose between good and evil. A rela-
tion between some mental element and punishment for a harmful
act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory
'[b]ut I didn't mean to' . . . . Unqualified acceptance of this
doctrine by English common law in the Eighteenth Century was
indicated by Blackstone's sweeping statement that to constitute
any crime there must first be a 'vicious will' ....
'Crime as a compound concept, generally constituted only
from concurrence of an evil meaning mind with an evil doing
hand, was congenial to an intense individualism and took deep
and early root in American soil.'23
Subjecting an individual who really has not been proven to be any-
thing but a drunken trespasser to the stigma and potential sanctions of a first
degree felony conviction would not be appropriate under any conventional
theory of penology. Insofar as retribution and prevention of recidivism by
the defendant are concerned, any substantial period of imprisonment in a
penitentiary would amount to overkill. With respect to furnishing an
opportunity for rehabilitation, the period of incarceration might bear no
relation to his problem with alcohol. Insofar as making an example of the
defendant to deter others is concerned, his punishment might alarm heavy
drinkers but could only amuse would-be burglars.
The United States Supreme Court has not read the Constitution to
provide the same pervasive restraints on state substantive criminal law as
on state procedure. The United States Constitution reserves to the states
considerable freedom in defining crimes, including their mental elements,
and in establishing penalties to be attached to the crimes defined.24
22. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
23. Id. at 250-51 (footnotes omitted).
24. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576
(1959). Naturally, the freedom has its limits, but federal deferral to the states' right to control
actions within their own borders is great. When Leroy Powell, a chronic alcoholic, asked the
United States Supreme Court to set aside his conviction under a Texas statute that prohibited
public drunkenness on the ground that he was unable to conform to its mandate, Justice
Black, joined by Justice Harlan, concurred with the majority's reluctance to dictate the
substantive criminal law for the several states.
We are asked to tell the most distant Islands of Hawaii that they cannot apply their
local rules so as to protect a drunken man on their beaches and the local com-
munities of Alaska that they are without power to follow their own course in
deciding what is the best way to take care of a drunken man on their frozen
soil. . . . It is always time to say that this Nation is too large, too complex and
composed of too great a diversity of peoples for any one of us to have the wisdom to
establish the rules by which local Americans must govern their local affairs. The
constitutional rule we are urged to adopt. . . departs from the ancient faith based
on the premise that experience in making local laws by local people themselves is by
far the safest guide for a nation like ours to follow.
Powell v. Texas, 382 U.S. at 547-48.
Nevertheless a state statute eliminating, across the board, the mental
elements of all specific mens rea crimes for grossly intoxicated persons
might well be found to violate the United States or Pennsylvania' Con-
stitutions, if not on its face at least in its application to crimes that in the
absence of mental elements do not involve substantial culpability, harm or
danger.
Of the possible federal constitutional objections2 6 that might be made
to such a statute, it is probably most vulnerable to attack on the ground that
the statute, or an application, violates the prohibition against "cruel and
unusual punishments" of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. If, for
example, the drunken "burglar" in our hypothetical were sentenced to
lengthy imprisonment, he could make strong arguments that his incarcera-
tion is cruel and unusual under any of the differing standards that the
individual Justices advanced in Furman v. Georgia.27 He could argue that
the sentence in his particular case is "grossly disproportionate" to his
crime, even after great deference is accorded to the judgment of the
legislature and of the court that imposed it. 28 He could make an even
stronger argument that the combination of the state's burglary and drunken
offender statutes gives so much unguided leeway to the sentencing judge
that the statutes lend themselves to wholly arbitrary and senseless applica-
tion29 and also to impermissible discrimination against minorities and the
poor. 30 He could make still more telling arguments that his punishment
violates the standards proposed by Justices Brennan3' and Marshall.32
Under their criteria, a court reviewing constitutionality measures the pun-
ishment against its own perceptions of sound penology and societal
attitudes.
B. The Old Common Law and Amended Section 308 Approaches
At old common law the courts would not permit a defendant who
voluntarily deprived himself of his wits to urge his infirmity as a defense to
a specific intent crime. His intent was presumed so long as he acted as if he
had the required intent. 33 Virginia is one state which has stayed close to the
25. See PA. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 9, 13.
26. Other possible federal constitutional objections include violations of substantive
due process and of equal protection.
27. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In the more recent death penalty cases some of the Justices
have reformulated their views on the meaning of the eighth amendment. See, e.g., Gregg v.
Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976).
28. See id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting), 414 (Powell, J., dissenting).
29. See id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring), 310 (White, J., concurring).
30. See id. at 240 (Douglas, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 257.
32. Id. at 314.
33. This view of intoxication is referred to as the "old common law" approach
somewhat arbitrarily, as a convenient way to distinguish it from the capacity defense
approach. Some courts very early decided that incapacitating intoxication was a defense to
specific intent crimes. At present the great majority of states by judicial decision or by statute
have opted for a capacity defense. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
529-33 (2d ed. 1960); J. MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 137-41 (1937); MODEL PENAL
CODE at 2-6 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); note 5 and accompanying text supra.
old law.34 Although Virginia recognizes voluntary intoxication which
renders a defendant incapable of forming a "willful, deliberate and pre-
meditated purpose or intent to kill" as a defense to first degree murder, it
does not extend the defense to other specific mens rea crimes. 35 A Virginia
practice manual recommends that jurors be charged as to such crimes in the
following terms:
A person cannot voluntarily make himself so drunk as to
become on that account irresponsible for his conduct during
such drunkenness. He may be perfectly unconscious of what he
does and yet be responsible. He may be incapable of specific
intent, but the law imputes specific intent. . from the nature of
the act and the circumstances under which the act was
committed.
36
A comparison of this jury charge with the pattern instruction prepared
by the Pennsylvania criminal instructions subcommittee indicates that the
subcommittee proposes to treat intoxication under amended section 308
pretty much as it was at old common law. The only difference between the
two charges lies in the language used to reconcile the required element of
specific mens rea with the general immateriality of intoxication. The
Pennsylvania instruction will, perhaps, be more readily understood by
jurors and more congenial to students of psychology and of the criminal
law.
It might be argued that the old common law-amended section 308
approach is subject to the same criticism as a statute eliminating all
elements of specific mens rea when the defendant is grossly intoxicated. A
requirement of specific mens rea that is so watered-down that it can be
satisfied by an "imputed intent" or "unconscious intent" does not differ
significantly from no requirement for purposes of federal and state con-
stitutions, legal doctrine and penal policy.
The answers to these arguments appear to be substantial enough to
support a conclusion that amended section 308's treatment of voluntary
intoxication is satisfactory from both a legal and policy standpoint. First,
because it is the old common law approach and continues to be used in
some states, it is not wholly theoretical and unprecedented. In fact a
majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court favored this course as recently
as the 1971 Tarver case. Second, on its face it is not inconsistent with the
traditional preference for subjective culpability of which Justice Jackson
spoke in Morrisette. And, if one believes the maxim "in vino veritas" it
permits conviction of persons whose acts have exposed their true natures
even though they happened to be drunken zombies at the time.
34. There have been modern decisions in other states adhering to the old common law.
See, e.g., Missouri v. Shipman, 354 Mo. 265, 189 S.W.2d 273 (1945); Vermont v. Stacy, 104
Vt. 379, 160 A. 257 (1932).
35. Chittum v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 12, 174 S.E.2d 779 (1970).
36. M. DOUBLES, E. EMROCH & R. MERHIGE, VIRGINIA JURY INSTRUCTION § 103.061
(Sumo. 1975).
More importantly, it might be argued; this approach is less susceptible
than a capacity defense to manipulation by defendants and misapplication
by jurors. The great majority of moderately to grossly drunk or drugged
persons who commit putatively criminal acts are probably aware of what
they are doing and the likely consequences.37 In the case of those who are
drunk, alcohol may have diminished their perceptions, released their
inhibitions and clouded their reasoning and judgment, but they still have
sufficient capacity for the conscious mental processes required by the
ordinary definitions of all or most specific mens rea crimes. 38 For example,
a person can be quite far gone in drink and still capable of the conscious
intent to steal, which is an element of common law larceny. Later as the
result of retrograde amnesia some drunken offenders may genuinely
forget; but inability to remember in such cases is legally immaterial. Even
if, in principle, only those who had a conscious mens rea should be
convicted, it is not feasible at a trial held long after the event for the
prosecution to prove and the jury to determine reliably that a particular
drunken offender had a conscious as distinguished from an unconscious
intent. The argument then concludes: Amended section 308 is more likely
to ensure that defendants who did in fact have a conscious specific mens rea
are convicted than would a capacity defense. It minimizes the opportunities
for false claims by defendants and improper acquittals by juries. The
relatively small risk of improper convictions-if conviction of persons
having unconscious mens rea be deemed improper-is justified. 3
9
C. The Capacity Defense and Original Section 308 Approaches
Until now the capacity defense has been spoken of as a unitary
defense. If the defendant is charged with a specific mens rea crime and if at
the time of the alleged crime he was so intoxicated that he was unable to
entertain the required intent, knowledge or like mental state, the defense is
available. The matter is not so simple. The capacity defense can and has
assumed a variety of forms.
One proposal which has never been taken up by any state is that the
defense of voluntary, as well as involuntary, intoxication should parallel
37. On the effect of alcohol on mental processes see MODEL PENAL CODE 3-4 nn.2 & 4
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959); Paulsen, supra note 5, at 8-9, 16-18, 22; Stewart, Medicolegal
Aspects of Alcoholism, 8 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 210, 213-41 (1959). The effect of a drug on
mental processes depends upon the particular drug. L.S.D., for example, is likely to produce
more drastic symptoms than heroin. Expert witnesses will often be needed to enlighten the
jury when there is an issue of drug intoxication. See MODEL PENAL CODE 12-13 (Tent. Draft
No. 9, 1959). It is less clear that experts, other than those who observed or examined the
defendant while he was still under the influence after the crime, are needed or should be
allowed to testify when the issue is alcoholic intoxication. See Murphy, The Defense of
Voluntary Intoxication, 9 A.B.A.L. NOTES 7, 10 (1972).
38. E.g., willful, deliberate and premeditated murder is defined in some states to
require mature and meaningful thought processes clearly beyond the powers of a grossly
intoxicated individual. See COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CAL. SUPER. CT.,
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 8.77 (3d rev. ed. 1970).
39. A critic of section 308 might reply that if the object of that section is to ensure the
conviction of defendants who had conscious mens rea it is overly broad and therefore violates
both federal and state substantive due process. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); W.
LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 136-146 (1970).
the state's insanity defense.4' The premise is that if an individual is
mentally handicapped at the moment of crime it should make no difference
whether his handicap is the product of disease or chemistry. The objections
to the proposal are obvious. Most people can see moral or social differ-
ences between self-induced intoxication and mental disease. If intoxication
were equated to insanity in a M'Naghten jurisdiction, then a drunken
defendant would have a defense if he were incapable at the time of the
crime of knowing what he was doing or of knowing that what he was doing
was wrong. Even moderate drunkenness can seriously impair an individu-
al's ethical sense-his knowledge and appreciation of right and wrong.
The inhibitions, judgment and discretion of many people fail in early stages
of alcoholic intoxication.41 Furthermore an insanity-type test would not be
limited to specific mens rea crimes; it would be available to any and all
crimes. In sum, a voluntary intoxication defense modeled on the insanity
defense would exonerate more defendants than is socially tolerable, espe-
cially in a jurisdiction having a liberal test for insanity.42 No American
jurisdiction has been willing to go further than allowing voluntary intoxica-
tion to provide a defense when it negates a mental element the actual
existence of which is required by the definition of the crime charged.
The states that employ the capacity defense are likely to cast it in one
or the other of two basic forms. Recent Pennsylvania law contains exam-
ples of both. Graves followed the traditional form43 of the defense in which
a distinction is made between specific mens rea crimes and general mens
rea crimes. Voluntary drunkenness can render the defendant incapable of
forming the requisite mens rea for the former but not for the latter. Crimes
Code section 308 when originally enacted roughly followed the Model
Penal Code 4 form of the defense. It did not speak in terms of "capacity"
or of "specific mens rea" but simply provided:
Intoxication or drugged condition are not, as such, defenses
to a criminal charge; but in any prosecution for any offense,
evidence of intoxication or drugged condition of the defendant
may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to
negative an element of the offense.
45
Some advantages that might be claimed for the traditional form are
that since it has been around for a long time it speaks in language which,
within each jurisdiction, has practical meaning to judges and lawyers and
40. J. HALL, supra note 33, at 554. Professor Hall, although willing to concede a fully
exculpating insanity-like defense to inexperienced drinkers, would not grant the same
indulgence to experienced drinkers who had done persons harm on earlier occasions while
intoxicated. The latter act recklessly when they voluntarily become drunk and that culpability
justifies their conviction of crimes of recklessness committed in that condition. Id. at 552-57.
41. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
42. E.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate
the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
43. See note 5 and accompanying text supra.
44. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(1) (Proposed Official Draft; 1962).
45. Act of 1972. No. 334 § 308 (current version at 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 308 (1975)).
with which they are comfortable. Furthermore, it has functioned to restrict
the availability of intoxication as a defense very substantially. By its terms
it confines the defense to the specific mental elements of specific mens rea
crimes. In practice, in many jurisdictions, relatively few crimes are recog-
nized as specific mens rea crimes and hence eligible for the defense.
A Model Penal Code form of the defense can be supported by
arguments that the specific mens rea-general mens rea dichotomy is
artificial and obscure,46 and gives insufficient effect to the fact of intoxica-
tion if the law's objective really is to deal with drunk and sober persons on
the same footing. Under the Model Penal Code formulation, the courts do
not use any intermediate classifying tool in deciding whether intoxication
can provide a defense. Rather they look to all elements of the crime alleged
to see whether any element has been or should be construed to require proof
of some actual purpose, knowledge or other conscious mental state. If so,
then evidence of intoxication is admissible for whatever value it may have
in disproving the presence of that mental state.
4 7
From what has been said, it is obvious that if a legislature enacts either
the traditional or Model Penal Code capacity defense, the courts are left
with the very considerable task of deciding whether particular crimes are
subject to an intoxication defense. How should the courts go about decid-
ing whether a particular crime is a specific mens rea crime-the traditional
test-or that the crime includes a conscious mental element-the Model
Penal Code test-if the legislative and prior judicial definitions do not
unequivocally emphasize some conscious mental state or process as being
essential for conviction? The problem is, of course, one of interpreting the
statute proscribing the crime; the courts may weigh, along with the usual
factors that go into statutory construction, all the policy considerations that
favor or oppose recognition of an intoxication defense. The courts that use
the traditional form of the defense seem to have an easier time of taking
such policy considerations into account, perhaps because the principal
utility of the specific mens rea-general mens rea dichotomy is to identify
crimes that are eligible for the intoxication defense. 48 For example, they
consistently refuse to extend the shelter of the specific mens rea category to
crimes that by their ordinary definitions require a high degree of conscious
recklessness, e.g., certain statutory degrees of murder.49 On the other hand
a court bound by the Model Penal Code defense as it appears in the original
Crimes Code section 308 would probably have to conclude that gross
drunkenness can negate conscious recklessness. In fact, to avert just that
conclusion, the draftsmen of the Model Penal Code recommended that the
statutory statement of the intoxication defense include the qualification that
46. J. HALL, supra note 33, at 441-45.
47. MODEL PENAL CODE 6-7 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
48. The dichotomy is also used in some jurisdictions in determining whether an honest
(as opposed to an honest and reasonable) mistake of fact can provide a defense and whether
mental abnormality short of legal insanity (diminished capacity) is available as a defense.
49. See Note, Intoxication as a Criminal Defense, 55 COLUM. L. REV. 1210, 1214-15
(1955).
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"[w]hen recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor,
due to self induced intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he would
have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial. "50
Putting aside the differences between the traditional and Model Penal
Code forms of the capacity defense, a number of advantages can be
claimed for both forms as compared to the old common law's refusal to
recognize voluntary intoxication as a defense. By allowing drunkenness or
drugged condition to negate requisite mental elements they tend to deal
with intoxicated and sober defendants in the same way. This is desirable
because when the definition of a crime requires proof of a mental element
the underlying reasons for requiring such proof will almost certainly be
present whether the absence of the mental element was due to the defend-
ant's voluntary intoxication or other causes. When the legislature in
defining a crime makes a mental element essential for conviction, the
reason is very likely to be that in the absence of such a state of mind neither
the defendant nor his conduct are as culpable, injurious or threatening.
Furthermore, the punishments authorized for the crime are also likely to
reflect a legislative judgment that penalties of that severity are suitable, in
terms of retribution, deterrence, prevention of recidivism or rehabilitation
for defendants who have consciously broken the law.
5 1
With respect to fears that a capacity defense will result in unwarranted
acquittals because of false claims, difficulties of proof, and jury confusion,
the advocates of the defense can argue that rationality and consistency of
substantive doctrine should not be sacrificed because of problems of proof.
Furthermore, many equally troublesome issues are regularly litigated
before juries, such as insanity and voluntariness of confession. They can
also point to widespread successful experience with the defense. The
majority of states have allowed the defense for many years apparently
without any adverse effects on the administration of justice. As a matter of
fact until 1971, when Tarver told them they were wrong, the lower
Pennsylvania courts had been applying a capacity defense to many specific
intent crimes besides premeditated murder. 52 The Commonwealth
survived.
D. Special Crimes
Another alternative available to a legislature is to create special crimes
that can be committed by intoxicated persons who cause serious injury or
engage in especially threatening or offensive conduct. 53 This sort of crime
is not without precedent. For example, criminal statutes proscribing drunk-
50. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
51. See MODEL PENAL CODE 7-8 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). The members of the
Advisory Committee that drafted the Model Penal Code's section on intoxication were
divided on whether intoxication should be allowed its full relevance in negating an element of
conscious recklessness. Id.
52. Smith, supra note 2, at 15, 27-28, 45.
53. See MODEL PENAL CODE 8 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). J. HALL, vupra note 33, at 553.
en driving and drunk and disorderly conduct are commonplace. Individu-
als who know from prior experience that they are troublemakers when under
the influence might be singled out for harsher punishment.5 4 Such "drunk
and dangerous" crimes might be useful in a state with a liberal capacity
defense. They would provide means for punishing a drunken offender in a
situation where there is no appropriate criminal charge to which intoxica-
tion is not a defense.
Procedurally, in a case in which the prosecutor anticipated an intoxi-
cation defense he might obtain an indictment alleging the drunk and
dangerous crime either alone or together with an ordinary offense. In the
latter situation the jury would be told they must consider the crimes as
alternatives and cannot convict the defendant of both. When the prosecutor
did not foresee the intoxication issue and the indictment simply alleged an
ordinary crime it would not be unfair to recognize the drunk and dangerous
offense as a lesser included offense if the defendant pursued an intoxication
defense.
E. Modified or Combined Approaches
A legislature need not be doctrinaire in its treatment of intoxication.
Rather than simply opting for an old common law approach or one of the
forms of the capacity defense already discussed or creating special crimes
for intoxicated persons, it can further refine any one of these alternatives or
combine two or more of them.
Consider the capacity defense. When applied to particular crimes it
speaks in such terms as intent, conscious purpose, knowledge, and intoxi-
cation which renders the defendant incapable of the same. These terms do
not refer to matters that are simply and inevitably matters of fact. They
refer to psychological processes and states and therefore do have a factual
aspect; but they also leave room for a policy judgment concerning the kind
and quality of mental activity or condition that constitutes a legally sig-
nificant intent, conscious purpose or the like. In other words, they have a
legal dimension. If the legislature does not give further definition to these
terms then the policy judgment is left to the courts. If the courts do not
elaborate on the statutory definition then the policy judgment falls to that
voice of the community, the jury.
A legislature could decide that, although it does not want to permit an
unconscious or imputed mens rea to suffice for a drunken offender, it wants
the jury to be told that he may be convicted on a lesser quality mens
rea-e.g., intent or knowledge at a lower level of awareness-than is
required for a sober person. This treatment of intoxication represents a
54. One technique that might be used in a jurisdiction normally allowing a capacity
defense would be to disallow the defense if the prosecutor proved that the defendant knew
from prior experience that he was dangerous when drunk. In effect the jurisdiction would
have a dual intoxication defense, a capacity defense for inexperienced or non-dangerous
drinkers and the harsher old common law treatment for experienced, dangerous drinkers.
compromise between the usual capacity defenses and the old common law
approach and reflects a different evaluation of the principles, policies and
pragmatic consideration involved.
Some possible combinations of approaches have already been men-
tioned. For example, amended Crimes Code section 308, while basically
adhering to the old common law, does permit the capacity defense in cases
of premeditated murder. Section 2.08 of the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code excepts crimes involving conscious recklessness from
the full benefits of its capacity defense. A legislature could consider the
major crimes in its criminal code one by one, decide as to each whether the
capacity defense should be allowed, and incorporate its decisions into the
code. It has been pointed out that the courts that follow the capacity defense
already do this. A legislature, however, has more freedom in making wise
choices than 'a court constrained by precedent and principle. The ultimate
question becomes: Would the legislature take the time and trouble needed
for wise choices?
IV. Conclusions
The Pennsylvania Legislature in its 1976 amendment to section 308 of
the Crimes Code treats the intoxication defense pretty much as it was dealt
with under old common law. Amended section 308 is not only constitu-
tional but satisfactory from the standpoint of principle and policy. There
are other ways of dealing with the intoxication defense; most of them are
acceptable. Both the traditional form of the capacity defense and the Model
Penal Code form, when it includes the qualification regarding reckless-
ness, are probably superior to amended section 308 on the whole, but not
demonstrably so. A legislature's choice of the common law approach or
one of the conventional formulations of the capacity defense is not likely to
affect the result in many cases. The verdict and the justness of the verdict
are much more likely to turn on the adequacy of the evidence, the persua-
siveness of counsel, and the clarity of the court's instructions to the jury. 
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55. On the defense of voluntary intoxication generally and the problems involved in
charging a jury on that defense see Murphy, The Defense of Voluntary Intoxication, 9
A.B.A.L. NOTES 7 (1972); Murphy, TheIntoxication Defense:An Introduction toMr. Smith's
Article, 76 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1971).
APPENDIX
SUBCOMMITTEE DRAFT - APRIL 24, 1976
TO BE USED WHEN ACT NO. 32 (1976) IS APPLICABLE
§ 8.308A (Crim) VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION OR DRUGGED
CONDITION NO DEFENSE
(1) Voluntary (intoxication) (drugged condition) is not a defense to a
criminal charge. A person who- voluntarily uses (intoxicants) (drugs)
cannot become so (drunk) (intoxicated) (drugged) that he is for that
reason legally incapable of committing a crime.
[(2) One of the elements of the crime of is that the
defendant had a certain mental state, that is the defendant (intended
) (knew ) ( ). A defendant cannot be guilty of the
crime of - unless he had that state of mind at the time of the alleged
crime. However, in the case of a voluntarily (intoxicated) (drugged)
defendant it is not necessary that the defendant be conscious or aware of
his own state of mind. It is enough if the required mental state is present
somewhere in his (drunken) (intoxicated) (drugged) mind or is expressed
in his acts.]
(3) Thus if you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed a particular crime as I defined it in my instructions
you should find him guilty of that crime even though you believe he was
(intoxicated) (drugged) at the time.
SUBCOMMITTEE NOTE
This instruction is appropriate when the defendant is charged with
any crime other than first degree murder, and there is evidence that the
defendant was voluntarily intoxicated from the consumption of alcohol
or drugs. Subdivisions (1) and (3) constitute a basic instruction of
general applicability. Subdivision (2) may be used when the defendant is
charged with a crime that includes one or more mental elements which
gross intoxication might otherwise negate, e.g., arson, burglary, receiving
stolen property. If subdivision (2), or a similar instruction is not
given in such a case, the jury will have no guidance on how to resolve the
conflict between the normal definition of the crime and the principle that
voluntary intoxication is no defense. When subdivision (2) is used it will
ordinarily be desirable to include an instruction on proof of intent,
knowledge or other mental state by circumstantial evidence, e.g., by the
acts and behavior of the defendant and the surrounding circumstances.
• . . [Balance of Note omitted.]
APPENDIX
SUBCOMMIlTEE DRAFT - APRIL 24, 1976
TO BE USED WHEN ACT NO. 32 (1976) IS APPLICABLE
§ 8.308B (Crim) VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION OR DRUGGED
CONDITION AS DEFENSE TO FIRST DEGREE
MURDER
(1) The general rule is that voluntary (intoxication) (drugged condition)
is not a defense to a criminal charge. Generally speaking, a person
who voluntarily uses (intoxicants) (drugs) cannot become so (drunk)
(intoxicated) (drugged) that he is for that reason legally incapable of
committing a crime.
(2) The general rule is subject to a qualification when the crime
charged is first degree murder. The defendant is permitted to claim as a
defense that he was so (drunk) (intoxicated) (drugged) at the time of the
killing that he did not possess the specific intent to kill required for first
degree murder.
(3) The Commonwealth has the burden of disproving this defense.
Thus, you cannot find the defendant guilty of first degree murder unless
you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not
so (intoxicated) (drugged) at the time that he was incapable of judging
his acts and their consequences or incapable of forming a wilful,
deliberate and premeditated design to kill.
(4) Voluntary (intoxication) (drugged condition) may reduce a
crime of murder from first degree to third degree. Voluntary (intoxication)
(drugged condition) however is no defense to a charge of (third
degree murder) (voluntary manslaughter) (
SUBCOMMITTEE NOTE
This instruction is appropriate when the defendant is charged with
first degree murder and there is an issue of whether the defendant
because of voluntary intoxication induced by alcohol or drugs was
incapable of the necessary specific intent.
This instruction is based on Crimes Code §§ 308,2502; Commonwealth
v. Haywood, - Pa. -, 346 A.2d 298 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Rose, 457 Pa. 380, 321 A.2d 880 (1974); Commonwealth v. Tarver, 446
Pa. 233, 284 A.2d 759 (1971).

